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Abstract
Global economic activity is surrounded by increasing uncertainties from various sources.
In this paper, we focus on commodity prices and estimate a global commodity uncer-
tainty factor by capturing comovement in volatilities of major agricultural, metals and
energy commodity markets through a group-specific Dynamic Factor Model. Then, by
computing impulse response functions estimated using a Structural VAR model, we find
that an increase in the common commodity price uncertainty results in a substantial and
persistent drop in investment and trade for a set of emerging and advanced economies.
We show that a global commodity uncertainty shock is more detrimental for economic
growth than usual financial and economic policy uncertainty shocks. Last, our method-
ology turns out to be a way to disentangle the macroeconomic effects of "good" and
"bad" oil uncertainty: when an oil uncertainty shock is common to all commodities,
then the macroeconomic effect is likely to be negative, but when this shock is specific to
the oil market, the effect tends to be positive in the short run.
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1 Introduction
The theory of investment under uncertainty predicts that higher uncertainty increases firms’
real option to wait for uncertainty resolution and ultimately leads to postponement of in-
vestment (Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 1990; Pindyck, 2004). A large and growing body in
the macroeconomics literature has identified the dampening effect of economic uncertainty
shocks on various economic variables (see for example Bloom et al., 2007; Bloom, 2009;
Carrière-Swallow and Cespedes, 2013; Jurado et al., 2015; Leduc and Liu, 2016; Baker et al.,
2016; Caldara et al., 2016; Basu and Bundick, 2017; among others). In particular, Bloom
(2009) points out that uncertainty shocks (proxied by spikes in the VXO index) result in a
subsequent decrease in US industrial production growth. Also, by comparing advanced and
emerging countries, Carrière-Swallow and Cespedes (2013) find that shocks in the VXO in-
dex have a significant dampening effect on investment growth in emerging countries, much
larger than in major advanced economies. Another strand of the literature on trade, identifies
the significant contractionary effect of uncertainty shocks on international trade (Feng et al.,
2017; Gervais, 2018; Handley, 2014; Handley and Limao, 2015, 2017; Novy and Taylor, 2020;
Tam, 2018). For example, Novy and Taylor (2020) show, both theoretically and empirically,
that economic uncertainty shocks have a bigger contractionary effect on international trade
flows compared to their respective negative effect on economic activity.
However, it turns out that uncertainty can be generated by various sources. In the wake
of the seminal paper by Bloom (2009), it is often assumed that global uncertainty is related
to uncertainty in financial markets as proxied by the VXO. More recently, macroeconomic
uncertainty has been put forward, for example in the paper of Jurado et al. (2015) in which the
authors assume that uncertainty is measured by squared deviations of a set macroeconomic
variables with respect to their conditional expectations stemming from an econometric model
(see also Scotti, 2016, for alternative macroeconomic uncertainty measures). Uncertainty can
also be generated by policymakers through the implementation of some economic policies (i.e.,
monetary, fiscal or trade policies). One of the recent examples is the large increase of tariffs on
some goods coming from China by the Trump administration that generated an uncertainty
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spike in the global trade with negative effects on global GDP growth by up to 0.75 pp in
2019 (see Ahir et al., 2019). In this respect, Baker et al. (2016) have developed a number of
Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indexes with the aim of capturing the uncertainty due
to economic policies around the globe. The main idea on which those indexes are built is to
count some specific words appearing in newspapers of a given country. Those EPU indexes
are now widely used in the empirical literature and carefully monitored by policymakers
in international institutions. Another specific source of uncertainty that has been widely
considered in the empirical literature is related to the large variations that can be seen in
oil prices. Against this background, it is generally assumed that oil uncertainty is proxied
by oil price volatility. The recent oil-macroeconomics literature has put some emphasis on
the significant recessionary effect of oil price uncertainty shocks on U.S. economic activity
(Ferderer, 1996; Guo and Kliesen, 2005; Elder and Serletis, 2010; Jo, 2014; Rahman and
Serletis, 2011; Elder, 2018). For example, Elder and Serletis (2010) show that oil price
uncertainty (estimated through a GARCH-type model) has a significant and long-lasting
dampening effect on U.S. economic activity. In addition, Ferderer (1996) shows that oil
price volatility contains a significant part of the explanatory power of asymmetric oil price
shocks on U.S. economic activity. Guo and Kliesen (2005) show that oil price volatility
(approximated by the quarterly realized variance of the daily returns of WTI crude oil prices)
contains extra predictive power on U.S. output when compared to that of asymmetric oil price
shocks. Overall, the consensus in the relevant literature is that oil uncertainty shocks have
a significant recessionary effect on economic activity. One of the few exception is the paper
by Punzi (2019) who theoretically and empirically shows that an oil uncertainty shock is
likely to generate short-term positive outcome as households and companies tend to increase
today their consumption of energy, facing possible increase in future prices. This idea that
positive economic outcomes can be generated from an uncertainty shock is referred to as the
growth-option channel by Bloom (2014). This has been also considered by Segal et al. (2015)
and Forni et al. (2021) who disentangle "good" and "bad" uncertainty shocks: a "good"
uncertainty shock results in positive economic growthn while a "bad" uncertainty shock leads
to the opposite.
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Howevever, to our knowledge, there exists no empirical evidence on the impact of non-oil
commodity uncertainty shocks, like agricultural or metals’ uncertainty shocks. One exception
is Tran (2021), who examines the combined effect of oil and non-oil price uncertainty shocks
on economic activity and shows that a trade-weighted commodity price uncertainty index
(constructed by using a broad set of agricultural, metals and energy commodity prices) has
a significant recessionary effect on Australian economic activity, aggregate consumption and
export growth. With our paper, we attempt to fill this gap in the relevant literature.
Independently, there is a large and growing body in the literature on commodity markets
as a whole, not necessarily focusing only on the oil market, showing that commodity prices
tend to move together and that commodity price shocks account for a large share of business
cycle fluctuations, especially for developing countries (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1990; Frankel
and Rose, 2010; Byrne et al., 2013; Fernandez et al., 2017; Drechsel and Tenreyro, 2018;
Fernandez et al., 2018, Gruber and Vigfusson, 2018). Frankel and Rose (2010) mention
that there are times when the prices of many commodities move so much together that it
is difficult to ignore the existence of macroeconomic phenomena driving these comovements.
Fernandez et al. (2017) show that unexpected changes in global commodity price shocks
account for more than one third of global output fluctuations, while Fernández et al. (2018)
find that commodity price fluctuations are significant drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations
in small emerging market economies. A recently growing body of the literature has identified
the significant linkage between commodity price comovement and global demand conditions
by showing that a latent common factor capturing comovement in a large cross-section of
commodity prices is closely related to changes in global demand (Alquist et al., 2020; Delle
Chiaie et al., 2018).
In this paper, we assess the macroeconomic effects of common uncertainty shocks in com-
modity prices, for both advanced and emerging markets. In this respect, we compute the
comovement in uncertainty contained in major agricultural (corn, cotton, soybeans, wheat),
metals (copper, gold, silver, platinum) and energy (crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, petroleum)
commodity prices. As usual in this literature, we measure uncertainty as the quarterly realized
variance of the daily returns of those individual commodity prices, meaning that throughout
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this paper we will use indifferently the words uncertainty and volatility. Our econometric
methodology relies on a two-step procedure. In a first step, we extract the common uncer-
tainty by estimating a Bayesian Dynamic Factor Model (DFM) with a group-specific structure,
as put forward by Kose et al. (2003). The DFM enables to estimate two factors: (i) a global
commodity price uncertainty factor, which captures comovement across all commodity price
uncertainty series and (ii) a group-specific commodity uncertainty factor, which captures un-
certainty comovement for each group-specific commodity, namely, agriculture, metals and
energy markets. In a second step, for each advanced and emerging country, uncertainty fac-
tors are sequentially incorporated into a small-scale Structural VAR (SVAR) model, that also
integrates inflation, policy interest rates and a relevant macroeconomic variable. As macroe-
conomic variables, we mainly focus here on business investment and international trade, while
GDP and household consumption will be also considered as additional results. Impulse re-
sponse functions (IRFs) are then estimated to trace the dynamic impact of uncertainty shocks
on each variable. Aggregated results are presented for advanced and emerging countries as a
whole.
Our results provide a rich body of evidence about the role of global commodity price
uncertainty on the macroeconomic activity of both advanced and emerging countries and
extend the empirical research in several directions. First, we find that a global commodity
uncertainty shock depresses investment and trade (exports) in both emerging and advanced
economies. Those results are the first to point out evidence of a negative dynamic impact
of global commodity price uncertainty shocks on international trade and provide further in-
sights on the recent theoretical findings of Gervais (2018) and Novy and Taylor (2020) who
highlight the possible mechanisms through which uncertainty shocks lead to contractions in
international trade. In addition, we also show evidence of a negative impact of commodity
uncertainty shocks on GDP and household consumption. Second, we carry out a benchmark
analysis and compare our results with dynamic responses of popular uncertainty indexes,
namely the VIX and EPU indexes. It turns out that our global commodity uncertainty shock
leads to a stronger and more persistent negative response of investment and exports. We
provide here a new set of results suggesting that uncertainty on commodity prices is more
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detrimental on short-run economic activity than financial and economic policy uncertainty
measures. Third, unlike Carrière-Swallow and Cespedes (2013), who find a bounce-back effect
in investment of advanced economies after a financial uncertainty shock (proxied by the VIX),
we do not find any evidence of a bounce-back after a global commodity uncertainty shock,
meaning that this type of shock leads to a long-run impact on the level of investment and
thus on potential growth, through capital accumulation. In this respect, global uncertainty
commodity shocks are more detrimental for long-run economic activity than financial and
economic policy uncertainty measures. Fourth, we separately examine the macroeconomic
impact of the group-specific commodity uncertainty factors, namely agricultural, metals and
energy, once the global component has been removed and accounted for by the global factor.
A striking result is that energy-specific uncertainty shocks tend to have short-run positive
effects on economic activity, as measured by growth in investment, exports, GDP and con-
sumption, in line with the theoretical results of Punzi (2019). Our approach appears as a
way to disentangle the macroeconomic effects of "good" and "bad" oil uncertainty. Indeed,
it turns out that when a jump in oil uncertainty is common to all commodities, then the
macroeconomic impact is likely to be negative, as generally put forward in the literature.
However, when the uncertainty increase is specific to the oil market, then the macroeconomic
effect tends to be positive in the short run.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the methodology
that we use, including the dataset, the Dynamic Factor Model that we estimate to measure
global and commodity-group uncertainty as well as the SVAR models used to assess responses
to uncertainty shocks. Section 3 presents the empirical results and Section 4 focuses on
disentangling between "good" and "bad" oil uncertainty shocks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Data
We proxy commodity uncertainty with volatility measures based on daily data of commodity
futures prices. We focus on futures prices as they reflect expectations about the future
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commodity price evolutions, in the vein of the VIX financial uncertainty index. Following
the standard approach in the literature on commodity futures, we take the nearest maturity
commodity futures contracts which proxy for the spot price. We obtain daily series for
the GSCI nearby commodity futures prices from Datastream, for agricultural (corn, cotton,
soybeans, wheat), metals (copper, gold, silver, platinum) and energy (crude oil, heating oil,
petroleum, gasoline), that is n = 12 series. The daily commodity futures dataset covers the
period from January 1988 to January 2017.
We estimate commodity price uncertainty for commodity i, with i = 1 . . . , n, as the
quarterly realized variance of the daily returns of the commodity prices according to Equation








where T is the number of daily observations within the quarter t, rit,d are the daily growth rates
of any commodity i within the quarter t and ri is the average growth rate within the quarter
t. The realized variances RVi,t are multiplied by 252 (the number of trading days during one
calendar year) so that they can be annualized. Table (1) contains the correlation matrix,
which shows positive and relatively high correlation coefficient values within the dataset.
The average correlation across all 12 commodities realised variance is 50%. Importantly, the
correlation between commodity volatility series is higher within the same commodity group
(e.g. the correlations within the realised variances of energy is over 90% and that of agriculture
and metals commodities is over 60%). We also performed the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
and we reject the hypothesis of a unit root for all the realised variance series.
As regards macroeconomic data, we obtain domestic quarterly series for aggregate pri-
vate investment, consumer price indexes, industrial production indexes, private consumption
expenditure, real GDP, exports and the policy rate from the CEIC database. The only ex-
emption is the Brazil policy rate series which is downloaded from IMF database. All macroe-
conomic variables are expressed in million USD at 2011 prices and we focus on a balanced
dataset of 12 advanced and 12 emerging economies. We remove the seasonal variation of the
macro-series using the Dagum (1978) X-11 ARIMA method. We then compute the quarterly
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix for the Agricultural, Energy and Metals Commodity Markets Dataset (1988Q1-
2016Q4)
Corn Cot. Soy. Wheat Crude Heat. Petr. Gasl. Copp. Gold Plat. Silv.
Corn 1.00
Cotton 0.62 1.00
Soybeans 0.76 0.55 1.00
Wheat 0.75 0.62 0.59 1.00
Crude 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.22 1.00
Heating 0.14 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.93 1.00
Petroleum 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.99 0.96 1.00
Gasoline 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.28 0.91 0.91 0.94 1.00
Copper 0.55 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.30 0.42 0.50 1.00
Gold 0.58 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.63 1.00
Platinum 0.57 0.41 0.56 0.47 0.48 0.39 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.72 1.00
Silver 0.62 0.51 0.44 0.54 0.35 0.22 0.35 0.42 0.67 0.81 0.59 1.00
growth rates for all the seasonally adjusted macroeconomic series (except for the policy rate,
which is used in levels). The dataset covers the period from 1988q1 to 2016q41.
2.2 A Commodity-Specific Dynamic Factor Model
Our objective is to extract a common component from our set of n = 12 commodity realized
volatility series, while accounting for the specific sectoral form of the database split into three
groups: (i) agricultural (corn, cotton, soybeans, wheat), (ii) metals (copper, gold, silver,
platinum) and (iii) energy (crude oil, heating oil, petroleum, gasoline) volatilities. Against
this background, a Dynamic Factor Model (DFM) with hierarchical structure as put forward
by Kose et al. (2003), has proved useful, as shown for example by Karadimitropoulou and
Leon-Ledesma (2013), Delle Chiaie et al. (2018) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020).
This model is able to extract latent factors capturing both (i) the global comovement and (ii)
the group-specific comovements in the realized variance of agricultural, metals, and energy
commodity futures returns.
Our dataset consists in a panel of commodity realized volatility series, RVi,t, for i =
1 . . . , n. We assume that demeaned realized volatility series can be described by the following









t + εi,t (2)
1Some countries start a bit later: Argentina in 1993q2, Brazil in 1991q1, Colombia in 1996q2, Romania in
1995q1 and Turkey in 1998Q2.
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where FGt is the global uncertainty factor and F
g
t are the three group-factors (g = 1, 2, 3).
Coefficients βGi and β
g
i , g = 1, 2, 3, are respectively the factor loadings measuring the impact
of each commodity uncertainty i on the global factor FGt and the group-specific factor loadings
measuring the impact of each commodity uncertainty i on the group-factor F gt , for g = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, εi,t is the error term and is assumed to be uncorrelated cross-sectionally at all leads





ψi,lεi,t−l + ǫi,t, (3)
where ǫi,t ∼ N(0, σ
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t , are also assumed to follow an


























t ∼ N(0, σ
2
g). It turns out that both residuals in equation (3)
and factors in equations (4)-(5) are characterized by short-term dynamics described by p = 3.
Finally, the innovations εi,t, ν
G
t , and ν
g
t , are mutually orthogonal across all equations within
the system.
The model described by equations (2) to (5) is estimated through a Bayesian approach with
Gibbs sampling, which is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for approximating
joint and marginal distributions by sampling from conditional distributions. Using a MCMC
procedure, we can generate random samples for the unknown parameters and the unobserved
factors from the joint posterior distribution. This is feasible as the full set of conditional
distributions is known, that is parameters given data and factors, and factors given data and
parameters.
To describe our results, we employ variance decompositions measuring the relative con-
tributions of the different factors to the variance of the realized variance for each individual
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commodity. Using previous notations, and assuming orthogonality between the various com-
ponents, the variance of RVi,t is given by:
V (RVi,t) = (β
G
i )
2V (FGt ) + (β
g
i )
2V (F gt ) + V (εi,t). (6)
Finally, we can decompose the variance of each realized variance series, RVi,t, into the fraction
due to each of the two factors. In particular, the fraction of fluctuations due to any factor
f = G, g is given by:
(βfi )
2V (F ft )
V (RVi,t)
. (7)
Note that we obtain evaluations of equations (6) and (7) at each step of the Markov-Chain
involved in the Bayesian estimation process.
2.3 Assessing Impulse Responses through Structural VAR models
Now that the common uncertainty factor has been estimated, we are interested in assessing its
dynamic effects on some macroeconomic variables of our panel of countries. In particular, we
will focus here on business investment and exports, while results for household consumption
and GDP will be also considered in section 4. In this respect, we estimate a small-scale
SVAR model in order to assess Impulse Response Functions (IRFs). Following Caggiano
et al.(2014), we estimate for each country a 4-variable SVAR model in which we include
our estimated commodity uncertainty factor, the inflation rate, a macroeconomic variable of
interest (investment or exports) and the monetary policy rate (short-term interest rate of the
country). The SVAR model that we estimate is given in Equation (8) below:
A0Yt = c+ A1Yt−1 + . . .+ ApYt−p + εt (8)
where Yt is the 4-dimension vector of endogenous variables, c is a vector of constants, A0 is
the matrix of contemporaneous variables, A1 to Ap are matrices of coefficients controlling the
autoregressive dynamics and εt is a a vector of structural shocks serially uncorrelated, with




εIn. The lag-length p for our
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SVAR models is selected using the Schwartz (SBIC) optimal-lag length information criterion2.
The SBIC criterion selects a SVAR dynamics with two or three lags for most of country-specific
SVARs, hence, for sake of comparability with factor dynamics we include three lags (p = 3) in
all country-specific SVAR models for advanced and emerging economies. We estimate SVAR
models for all advanced and emerging countries using the following ordering3:
Yt = (unt, πt, xt, it)
′
where unt is the global commodity uncertainty as estimated by the common commodity
uncertainty factor, πt is the quarterly inflation rate, xt is a given macroeconomic variable of
interest (here, investment or exports) and it is the nominal policy interest rate.
As usual in the econometrics literature, identification of the A0 matrix is carried out
imposing some restrictions. In fact, our identification strategy relies on the exogenous un-
certainty shocks approach as put forward by Bloom (2009). The main idea is to not include
the commodity uncertainty factor into the SVAR model, but rather to directly include the
estimated commodity uncertainty shock. In this respect, the commodity uncertainty shock is
computed using the series of events collected by Piffer and Podstawski (2018), who include
all the uncertainty episodes suggested by Bloom (2009) (peaks in the VXO index), as well as
some recent additional events. Moreover, in order to account for the magnitude of the ex-
ogenously determined global commodity uncertainty shocks (unlike Bloom, 2009, who assigns




t × 1t(event) (9)
where 1t(event) is the indicator function that takes the value of 1 if an uncertainty event
occurs at date t and 0 otherwise. This definition of a shock has been adopted for example
2Our SVAR estimates remain robust to the choice of lags to be included for the VAR model. More
specifically, our SVAR results remain unaltered when using Akaike or Hannan-Quinn information criteria for
optimal lag-selection of the SVAR models. Moreover, following Jo (2014) and Elder and Serletis (2010), we
estimate our SVAR models using a full year of lags (4 quarters) and our main findings remain unaltered.
These additional SVAR results are available upon request.
3Note that, for Argentina, in the absence of long series for inflation (quarterly Argentina inflation data
available only for 2015 onwards), we estimate a 3-variable VAR model.
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by Piffer and Podstawski (2018) or Carrière-Swallow and Cespedes (2013). Hence, the proxy
for global commodity uncertainty takes the value of our original uncertainty factor series
when, for a given quarter, a global uncertainty event takes place, and zero otherwise. In
this way, we examine, not only the timing of uncertainty shocks, but also the magnitude
of the exogenously determined commodity uncertainty shocks. This shock measure defined
by Equation (9) is integrated as the first endogenous variable in our SVAR model given by
Equation (8). Note that an alternative could be to introduce this shock as an exogenous
variable in the SVAR model, as in Carrière-Swallow and Cespedes (2013) who use a small
open economy assumption for each emerging country and treat shocks to S&P500 price level
and VXO index as exogenous to the local economies. As we deal with both advanced and
emerging economies, we prefer to keep this variable endogenous into the model, as we assume
dynamic feed-back effects from macroeconomic changes to commodity uncertainty4. Using
this specific ordering of variables and identification approach, we then estimate orthogonalized
IRFs5. Since we include 12 emerging and 12 developing countries in our analysis, we estimate a
total of 24 reduced-form SVARs as described by Equation (8). Aggregated IRFs for emerging
and advanced countries as a whole are computed by taking the median of all the 12 IRFs for
each group of countries. Lastly, in order to compare the dynamic effect of our commodity
uncertainty shock with responses to standard uncertainty shocks, we estimate similar SVARs
using the VIX index, as a proxy for financial uncertainty, and the global Economic Policy
Uncertainty index (EPU) of Baker et al. (2016), as a proxy for policy uncertainty measures.
Results are presented and discussed in Section 3 below.
4As robustness checks, we also estimate the SVAR model using the small open economy assumption as
in Carrière-Swallow and Cespedes (2013), treating uncertainty shocks as strictly exogenous to local macroe-
conomic nominal and real outcomes, and our findings remain overall unchanged. Those results are available
upon request.
5Robustness checks as regards model specification are discusses in sub-section 4.2.
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Table 2: Factor loadings for the commodity price uncertainty series from the estimation of
the commodity-specific DFM









Heating oil 1.72 5.17
Gasoline 2.41 5.15
Petroleum 2.31 5.65
Crude oil 2.91 7.07
3 Empirical results
3.1 DFM estimation results
First, let’s consider estimation results from the Bayesian approach. Table 2 presents the esti-
mated factor loadings for both global factor and the three-specific commodity sectors. We first
note that all the loadings to the global factor, βG, are positive, meaning that all commodities
correlate positively with the global commodity uncertainty factor. Moreover, both loadings
βG and βg are relatively similar for agricultural and metals volatilities, while βg appear to be
much bigger than βG in the energy sector, reflecting thus a stronger correlation of volatilities
with their respective commodity group-specific factor. This reflects the previously observed
high correlation coefficients within the energy sector volatility variables (between 91% and
99%).
Figure 1 shows the time series of the global commodity uncertainty (GLUN hereafter)
factor, with confidence bounds. The tightness of the confidence bands demonstrates that the
factor is precisely estimated. The GLUN factor appears to be quite low during the 1990s,
then starts to slightly increase since 2000 to reach a peak during the Global Financial Crisis
13
Figure 1: Global commodity uncertainty factor
Note: This plot shows the time series of the global commodity uncertainty factor, which is the second
factor of the Dynamic Factor model presented in Equations (2) to (7) and captures the comovement
in the Realized Variance of agricultural, metals and energy commodity markets
(GFC). The GFC was really an event that led to synchronized volatilities across all the mar-
kets. In the wake of the GFC, the commodity volatility stays high for a while, compared to
previous levels, before coming back to lower levels.
Figure 2 shows the time series of the three commodity-specific factors, namely agricul-
tural, metals and energy volatilities. Those three group-specific factors reflect the common
uncertainty of each group deflated from the volatility common to all commodities, that is the
GLUN factor. This is why, for example, we do not see any spike during the GFC, as this
spike is common to all commodities and has been accounted in the GLUN. As regards the
energy market, it seems to be the case that, as expected, the two oil shocks of the 1990’s and
in 2014 have widely affected the market, which displays peaks in the energy factor.
Variance decomposition results given by Equation (6) are presented in Table 3. The scales
of the factors and the realized variance are made comparable by multiplying the common and
market-specific factors by their respective estimated factor loadings (median of the MCMC
chain). Overall, we observe from this table that the idiosyncratic component has become the
least important driver for most of the commodity volatilities, suggesting an important role for
14
Figure 2: Global factor and variations in relative prices
Note: This plot shows the time series of the global commodity uncertainty factor which is the first
factor of the Dynamic Factor model presented in Equations (2) to (7) and captures the group-specific
comovement in the Realized Variance of agricultural, metals and energy commodity markets.
common factors, both global and group-specific, in explaining fluctuations in commodity price
uncertainty. We also note that for agriculture and metals volatilities, the common commodity
factor provides the largest contribution, meaning that the GLUN factor explains a large part
of the variance for those variables. However, this is not the case for the energy market, for
which market-specific factors explain nearly all the variability in the realized variance of those
commodities. This reflects the fact that the correlations within volatilities of the energy sector
are very strong.
3.2 Macroeconomic responses to a global commodity uncertainty
shock
3.2.1 Impact of the Global Uncertainty (GLUN) on investment
Following the findings of the relevant literature of investment under uncertainty (Bernanke,
1983; Bloom, 2009), according to which rising uncertainty leads to postponement of invest-
ment, we first empirically examine to what extent our estimated GLUN factor has an impact
15
Table 3: Variance decomposition from the estimation of the commodity specific DFM (in %)
Global commodity factor Commodity-group factor Idiosyncratic component
Corn 62.5 23.2 14.1
Cotton 39.9 10.6 48.9
Soybeans 37.1 33.6 29.2
Wheat 40.9 20.5 38.1
Copper 41.9 13.4 44.3
Gold 41.4 40.5 17.9
Silver 50.4 28.4 20.8
Platinum 40.2 17.4 42.1
Heating oil 3.1 91.1 5.6
Gasoline 19.3 71.2 9.5
Petroleum 11.9 87.6 0.5
Crude oil 11.8 86.1 2.1
on investment growth (INV). As previously described in Section 2, we base our analysis on the
IRFs to the GLUN factor shock on investment growth of advanced and emerging countries,
stemming from the baseline quadrivariate SVAR model presented in Equation (8).
IRFs to a global uncertainty shock are computed for all the countries in the sample and
we take the median IRFs for the block of advanced economies and for the block of emerging
market economies. Figure 3 plots the median IRFs, as well as their confidence intervals, for
advanced and emerging countries (respectively first row of the left and right panels). Results
show that the global commodity uncertainty shock leads on average to stronger and more per-
sistent negative effects in emerging economies. The trough at 2% is reached after 3 quarters
for emerging countries, while the trough is only of about 1.5% after 2 quarters for advanced
economies. Notably, there is on average no visible bounce-back after the initial drop for both
advanced and emerging countries. Those first results point out the common recessionary ef-
fect of a GLUN shock to major economies worldwide. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the
GLUN shock leads to an adverse effect on investment irrespectively of whether the countries
are net importers (mostly advanced countries) or net exporters (mostly emerging countries)
of commodities6. Figure 9 in the Annex presents detailed results by country. It is striking to
6In both our set of developing and advanced economies, we include countries which are net importers of
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Figure 3: Investment (INV) responses to exogenous GLUN, VIX and EPU shocks
Note: The solid line shows the medians of the estimated IRFs (expressed in %) for the set of advanced
and emerging countries, while the shaded area shows the 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals using
1000 repetitions.
see that all the countries have been negatively impacted by a global commodity uncertainty
shock. Some countries, in particular advanced countries such as Germany, Austria, Australia
and Switzerland, tend to exhibit a bounce-back after the drop as initially put forward by
Bloom (2009), but most of other countries do not present this specific over-shoot after the
drop.
In order to compare the significance of the GLUN factor, we estimate our set of country-
specific quadrivariate SVAR models using alternative popular measures of uncertainty. In this
respect, we focus on the VIX and the global Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index, which
are associated with business cycle fluctuations and economic recessions in the US and other
major developed and emerging economies (see among others Bloom, 2009; Carrière-Swallow
and Cespedes, 2013; Leduc and Liu, 2016; Baker et al., 2016). Median IRFs of investment,
as well as confidence bounds, are presented in Figure 3 for both the VIX (middle graph of
commodities, like Italy and Spain and countries which are producers and exporters of major oil and agricultural
commodities like France, Norway and India
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left and right panels) and the EPU (bottom graph of left and right panels). The response of
investment in advanced countries to a GLUN shock is significantly higher in magnitude and
persistence, compared with the respective responses of advanced countries to VIX and EPU
shocks. More specifically, our estimated IRFs show that investment in advanced countries
reaches a minimum of about -0.5% and -0.6% following VIX and EPU shocks, respectively,
while it reaches -1.5% two quarters after the initial GLUN shock. Moreover, we do not see
evidence of a bounce-back after a GLUN shock, while IRFs from investment to VIX and EPU
shocks come back into positive territory after four quarters. As regards emerging markets,
we also find that a GLUN shock leads to a stronger negative response than VIX and EPU
shocks, but none of the shocks is able to generate a bounce-back after the initial drop.
Interestingly, we confirm the results put forward by Carrière-Swallow and Cespedes (2013,
Figure 3, p. 320), in the sense that we observe a bounce-back in investment few quarters
after a VIX shock in advanced economies (also in line with seminal Bloom’s paper, 2009),
but not in emerging economies. The authors attribute this differential between the two types
of economies to the presence of financial frictions during high uncertainty periods in emerg-
ing countries. That is, when an uncertainty shock hits, it becomes much more difficult for
companies located in emerging countries to get access to credit to fund their projects, as the
financial sector is less developed. This result means that financial uncertainty shocks are
likely to have permanent effects on the level of investment in emerging countries, and thus on
potential growth through the accumulation of capital. On the contrary, this effect appears to
be more temporary in advanced countries. As a new result, we show here that an EPU shock
also leads to similar contrasting results between advanced and emerging countries. Indeed,
we get a strong bounce-back few quarters after an EPU shock on investment in advanced
countries, while there is no evidence of such pattern in emerging economies. This also means
that EPU shocks in emerging economies possess persistent effects on the level of investment,
and thus on potential growth. Wrong economic policies that generate uncertainty are thus
extremely damaging for long-run economic growth in emerging economies. In opposition,
this differentiation between the two types of countries doesn’t hold after a GLUN shock, as
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Figure 4: Exports’ responses to exogenous GLUN, VIX and EPU shocks
Note: The solid line shows the medians of the estimated IRFs (expressed in %) for the set of advanced
and emerging countries, while the shaded area shows the 68% bootstrapped confidence intervals using
1000 repetitions.
both advanced and emerging countries do not exhibit any recovery after the initial drop in
investment. This latter result suggests that global commodity shocks can be detrimental for
the long-run growth of the global economy as it is permanently affecting the investment level
in both advanced and emerging countries. Overall, our benchmarking analysis clearly shows
that the GLUN factor leads to larger drops in investment in both advanced and emerging
economies when compared to the respective impact of popular uncertainty proxies like the
VIX and EPU indexes.
3.2.2 Impact of the Global Uncertainty (GLUN) on exports
We now focus on the response of exports to various types of uncertainty shocks. To do that, we
replace the third variable in the SVAR (investment) with the quarterly exports growth (EXP)
and carry out the same SVAR analysis as previously shown. Figure 4 shows the aggregate
response of advanced and emerging countries, compared to VIX and EPU shocks7. SVAR
7Detailed results by country are presented in Figure 10 in the Annex
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results clearly highlight the persistently negative response of exports of advanced and emerging
economies to a GLUN shock. More specifically, both advanced and emerging countries exports
growth decreases by approximately 2% and 2.5%, respectively, after a positive GLUN shock,
with the effect remaining negative and statistically significant for two quarters after the initial
uncertainty shock. Similarly, both VIX and EPU shocks (middle and bottom graphs of left
and right panels, respectively) have a negative impact in the very short-run on exports of
both advanced and emerging countries. Interestingly, we also observe a differentiated impact
between advanced and emerging countries, in the sense that a bounce-back after the initial
drop in exports growth is only visible in advanced countries. A possible explanation relies
on financial frictions that limit the ability of exporters to borrow when global commodity
uncertainty jumps. When comparing the GLUN shock with VIX and EPU shocks, Figure
4 shows that the dynamic negative effect of a GLUN shock to exports is significantly larger
compared to that of VIX and EPU shocks. This result confirms those for investment, meaning
that a GLUN shock leads to a sharp reduction in the growth rate of economic variables.
Moreover, in advanced economies, the recovery in exports reaches its peak one year after the
initial VIX and EPU shock, while it needs five quarters for it to be reached after a GLUN
shock. Note also that the amplitude of the recovery is lower after a GLUN shock. This means
that a GLUN shock has a more persistent long-run impact on the level of exports of advanced
economies than the VIX and EPU shocks. As regards emerging economies, the amplitude
of recoveries after all types of shocks is similar, and non-significant, though the recovery is
lagged after a GLUN shock.
3.3 Macroeconomic responses to commodity-specific uncertainty shocks
In this subsection, we empirically assess the dynamic macroeconomic effects of the commodity-
specific uncertainty factors, once the global uncertainty has been removed. The three commodity-
specific factors, that is the agricultural price uncertainty (AGUN), the energy price uncer-
tainty (ENUN) and the metals’ price uncertainty (MTUN) factors, are presented in Figure 2.
Given that these group-specific factors capture uncertainty comovement within each group, a
surge in uncertainty within those sectors is likely to happen when there are some specific news
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Figure 5: Investment responses to exogenous AGUN, ENUN, and MTUN shocks.
Note: The solid line shows the estimated IRFs (expressed in %), while the shaded area shows the 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals using 1000 repetitions.
related to those markets, for example related to climatic conditions as regards agricultural
commodities, or related to OPEC news as regards energy commodities.
3.3.1 Impact of commodity-specific uncertainties on investment
Let’s first consider the impact of commodity-specific uncertainty shock on aggregate invest-
ment. In this respect, we estimate for all countries the baseline quadrivariate SVAR model
given by Equation (8) using alternatively the AGUN, MTUN and ENUN shocks as the first
variable in the ordering. Figure 5 presents the results obtained at the aggregate levels, for
both advanced (left panel) and emerging economies (right panel), as regards estimated IRFs
from INV to AGUN, MTUN and ENUN shocks, respectively. Detailed results for all countries
can be found in Figures 11, 12 and 13 in the Annex.
Focusing first on advanced economies, we can see in the left panel of Figure 5 that only
a shock on metals uncertainty is able to generate a significant negative response from invest-
ment, as well as a bounce-back after few quarters. This is the typical shape of an uncertainty
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shock on investment as put forward by Bloom (2009). This reflects the fact that metal prices
are strongly related to investment growth, so higher uncertainty concerning future metal
prices is likely to activate the real-option channel and a wait-and-see strategy from compa-
nies. This result reinforces the idea that prices in the metal sector are strongly associated
with the global business cycle (Fama and French, 1988; Labys et al., 1999; Hamilton, 2014;
Huang and Kilic, 2019). In opposition, IRFs resulting from agricultural- and energy-specific
uncertainty shocks do not appear to be significant. As far as energy uncertainty is concerned,
this result is surprising as the relevant literature has so far identified a significant negative
response of global economic activity to oil price uncertainty shocks (Elder and Serletis, 2010;
Jo, 2014; Elder, 2018). This result does not imply that energy uncertainty shocks are not
important, but rather that shocks in energy uncertainty are important when they coincide
with shocks in agriculture and metals. We discuss this puzzle in Section 4.
Focusing on emerging economies, we can see in the left panel that all the three shocks have
larger effects on investment compared to advanced countries, though MTUN shock appears
again to generate a much stronger response. But, both IRFs to AGUN and ENUN shocks
appear to be slightly significant after three quarters. Interestingly, our SVAR analysis shows
for the first time in the empirical literature, at least to our knowledge, that the investment
response of many emerging countries, such as Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey, to
an energy uncertainty shock turns out to be positive (see Figure 12 in the Annex). That’s
also true for some advanced countries such as Austria, Canada, France, Germany or Italy.
In theory, such results are plausible, but are rarely put forward in practice. Indeed, Bloom
(2014) recalls that an uncertainty shock can potentially have a positive impact on growth
through the growth-option channel. This channel occurs when potential positive outcomes
largely outweigh potential negative outcomes. We can imagine that this is especially the case
for energy prices that are able to reach very high levels, sometimes extremely rapidly. Such a
situation is also likely to happen when the costs of bad outcomes have a limited lower bound.
Punzi (2019) put also forward another possible channel of transmission via an immediate
higher consumption of energy by both households and companies. We discuss this issue in
the next section.
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Figure 6: Exports’ responses to exogenous AGUN, ENUN, and MTUN shocks.
Note: The solid line shows the estimated IRFs (expressed in %), while the shaded area shows the 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals using 1000 repetitions.
3.3.2 Impact of commodity-specific uncertainties on exports
We replicate the previous analysis by replacing the variable INV by EXP in the SVAR model
given by Equation (8) and by using sequentially AGUN, MTUN and ENUN shocks. Figure
6 presents the results obtained at the aggregate levels, for both advanced (left panel) and
emerging economies (right panel), as regards estimated IRFs from exports to AGUN, MTUN
and ENUN shocks, respectively8.
It is striking to see that MTUN and AGUN shocks generate a significant negative short-
run drop on exports, followed by a recovery that peaks five quarters after the shock. Those
results hold for both advanced and emerging countries. We note that uncertainty on metals
prices tend to lead to a more significant and persistent negative impact on exports than un-
certainty on agricultural prices. Similarly, to what we observed for investment, exports also
tend to react positively to an ENUN shock, though this effect is found to be significant only
8Detailed results for all countries can be found in the online appendix.
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for the second quarter after impact.
3.4 Robustness checks
In addition to investment and exports, we also consider two major macroeconomic variables,
namely Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and private consumption expenditures (CONS). IRFs
to a GLUN shock stemming from SVAR models estimated alternatively using GDP and
consumption are presented in Figure 7, for both advanced (left panel) and emerging economies
(right panel)9. We also plot on the same graph IRFs from investment and exports, so that
results can be directly comparable. Overall, we find that a GLUN shock has roughly the
same dynamic effect on those measures of economic activity, though aggregate GDP appears
to be somewhat less affected. In this way, we show that our results and conclusions as regards
the dampening effect of GLUN shock on economic activity are robust to the choice of the
economic activity variable. From Figure 7 we also see that exports are more severely impacted
from GLUN shocks compared to investment and consumption.
Figure 7: Macroeconomic responses to various energy uncertainty shocks
As additional robustness checks, we show that our SVAR model does not appear to be
sensitive to the choice of lags included and to the ordering of the variables. We also include
9The results on the effects of GLUN, AGUN, MTUN and ENUN shocks on real GDP and consumption
expenditures of advanced and emerging countries can be found in the online appendix.
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various other proxies for economic uncertainty like the geopolitical uncertainty index of Cal-
dara and Iacoviello (2018) and other well-known measures of oil price and uncertainty shocks
(Kilian, 2009; Elder and Serletis, 2010) and we show that the dynamic effect of the GLUN
factor is more significant when compared with that of oil price and uncertainty shocks. We
also estimate a 3-factor SVAR model in which we shut-down the policy rate and our results
remain unaltered. Finally, we estimate our SVAR model in which we treat commodity un-
certainty shocks as endogenous to the local economies and our results remain unchanged. All
those results are available upon request.
4 Disentangling between "good" and "bad" oil uncertainty:
From energy uncertainty to commodity uncertainty
The literature on uncertainty in commodity prices usually focuses on energy commodities,
and in particular on oil prices. Overall, empirical results tend to show that an oil uncer-
tainty shock leads to negative effects on economic activity, as shown for example by Elder
and Serletis (2010) or Jo (2014). However, recent papers are also showing that oil uncer-
tainty is likely to generate positive macroeconomic outcomes, in line with the growth-option
theory as put forward by Bloom (2014). For example, Punzi (2019) develops a small open
economy DSGE model in which oil uncertainty shocks generate short-term positive growth
on GDP, consumption and investment. Those results are confirmed by an empirical analysis
on some Asian countries using a Panel VAR model. The main underlying idea is that, facing
possible jumps in oil prices in the future, households and companies decide to increase their
consumption of energy at the present moment. In fact, it turns out that uncertainty can be
disentangled between "good" and "bad" uncertainty, the overall aggregate effect depending on
the weight of each component. Using the Bloom’s (2014) terminology, the "bad" uncertainty
activates the real-option channel and/or the risk-premium channel, leading to adverse macroe-
conomic effects, while the "good" uncertainty activates the growth-option channel, leading
thus to positive macroeconomic outcomes. For example, if we define an uncertainty shock
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as an increase in the second moments of the distribution of future events, Forni, Gambetti
and Sala (2021) propose to decompose total uncertainty between "downside uncertainty",
the part originating from the left tail of the distribution, and "upward uncertainty", the part
originating from the right tail. Using a combination of quantile regressions and SVAR models,
they empirically show on U.S. data that uncertainty shocks are not necessarily recessionary
and that the overall sign of the macroeconomic impact depends on the source of the uncer-
tainty shock ("downward" vs "upward") and the contributions of each component. Segal et
al. (2015) get similar results by disentangling the "good" and "bad" uncertainty effects on
aggregate output and asset prices using positive and negative realized semi-variances.
In this section, we come back to the results presented in the previous section 3 and we
point out how our approach can be seen as an efficient way to decompose between "good" and
"bad" oil uncertainty shocks. To understand the intuition behind our results, we estimate
two other models in addition to the group-specific DFM given by Equation (2). First, we
estimate a standard DFM in a Bayesian framework, using only the four energy uncertainty
measures that relate to the oil market, namely crude oil, heating oil, gasoline and petroleum.
We assume there is only one factor that captures the common comovement across those four
energy uncertainty measures, namely the pure energy uncertainty factor. Table 1 highlights
the very high correlation between the uncertainty measures of those four energy commodities
(correlation coefficients ranging from 91% to 99%). We then integrate this pure energy uncer-
tainty factor into a SVAR model, as described in section 3.3 in order to assess its effects on
investment. The bottom graph in Figure 8 (‘1-factor ENUN’ shock) shows that an increase in
pure energy uncertainty is associated with a negative response from investment10. This result
holds for both advanced and emerging economies. Take-away 1 of this comparison exercise:
a pure energy uncertainty shock leads to a negative effect on economic activity, as usually
highlighted in the literature.
Secondly, we re-estimate a standard DFM with only one common factor across the twelve
commodities series. This model is given by Equation (2) with βgi = 0, for all g = 1, 2, 3. Table
1 also highlights a significant correlation between the uncertainty measures of all twelve com-
10Similar results hold for GDP, exports and consumption
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Figure 8: Investment responses to various energy uncertainty shocks
modities. Note also that if we estimate a standard DFM for the four metals’ volatilities and
for the four agricultural volatilities, separately, we get that pure metals and pure agricultural
factors possess a strong correlation with the pure energy factor11. This suggests evidence
of a common pattern between commodity uncertainty measures. The estimation of this one
factor DFM enables us to directly extract the comovement among those twelve volatility mea-
sures. When doing this exercise, the results show that the four energy commodity volatilities
contribute to a very large extent to the common factor. Indeed, a variance decomposition
analysis shows that the common factor explains between 90% and 99% of the variance of the
four energy uncertainties. As a comparison, industrial commodities are close to 20% on aver-
age, while agricultural commodities represent about 8% on average. Take-away 2: including
only one factor to get common dynamics across commodities of different markets might bias
the results by magnifying the role of energy and downplaying the role of agriculture and metals
in the construction of the common factor. This result is mainly driven by the extremely high
correlation within the energy commodities as previously shown in Table 1. The level of group-
structure used to capture the comovement is important as shown by Kose et al. (2003) and
11Correlation is equal to 0.66 between pure uncertainty factors of agriculture and metals, to 0.30 between
agriculture and energy and to 0.48 between energy and metals
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Karadimitropoulou and Leon-Ledesma (2013). Failure to use the appropriate group-structure
implies that the comovement in commodity uncertainties contained in this global one-factor
model mainly reflects the comovement within the energy sector. The IRFs stemming from
this one-factor DFM are presented in Figure 8 (top graph, referred to as “1-factor GLUN
shock”). We observe that the response of investment to a “1-factor GLUN shock” is pretty
much identical to the response of investment to a “1-factor ENUN shock” obtained using
only the four energy variables. Moreover, the middle graph of Figure 8 , namely “2-factor
GLUN shock”, represents the IRFs stemming from our estimated commodity-specific DFM,
the two-factor model, whose results are described in section 3. We observe that the responses
of investment to a GLUN shock are similar to the other two estimated DFMs. Take-away
3: an energy uncertainty shock will have recessionary effects on economic activity when this
shock is common to agricultural and metals commodities.
Last, when looking at Figures 5 (for investment) and 6 (for exports), we note that, once
we account for global uncertainty, the remaining energy-specific uncertainty shocks generate
positive short-run outcomes on investment and exports, though the IRFs are only slightly
significant12. Take-away 4: when decomposing energy uncertainty into two main components,
that is the part of uncertainty that comoves with other non-energy commodities and the part of
uncertainty that is specific to the energy market, the results suggest that those two components
will have opposite effects on economic activity (i.e. investment, exports, consumption, and
GDP). Thus we point out here innovative findings as regards the way to decompose between
"good" and "bad" oil uncertainty shocks through a group-specific DFM. Our approach con-
stitutes an alternative way for this kind of decomposition, different from the ones from Segal
et al. (2015) or Forni et al. (2021).
The lesson of this empirical analysis is the following: when trying to disentangle the
macroeconomic effects of "good" and "bad" oil uncertainty, considering other commodity
prices seems to be crucial. It turns out that when the spike in uncertainty is common to all
12Similar results hold for other macroeconomic aggregates, such as GDP and consumption. Detailed results
are available in the online appendix)
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commodities, then the macroeconomic impact is likely to be negative, as generally put forward
in the literature. However, when the uncertainty increase is specific to the oil market, then
the macroeconomic effect tends to be positive in the short run, as advocated for example by
Punzi (2019).
5 Conclusions
The global economy is facing many uncertainties from various sources. In this paper, we shed
light on one particular type of uncertainty, that is the uncertainty inherent to commodity
prices, as proxied by volatility. Generally, the literature tends to only focus on oil uncertainty,
pointing out its negative impact on economic activity (Elder and Serletis, 2010; Jo, 2014;
Elder, 2018). Yet, our results highlight that this is not only an oil story, and that looking at
the common uncertainty across various commodities provides useful information.
By properly extracting the uncertainty component common to various commodity prices
through a commodity-specific Dynamic Factor Model, we show that a global commodity
uncertainty shock leads to a significant negative impact on economic activity, for both short
and long horizons. We also show that this type of shock turns out to be much more detrimental
for economic activity than usual uncertainty shocks, such as financial uncertainty or economic
policy uncertainty shocks.
Our methodology can also be seen as way to disentangle the macroeconomic effects of
"good" and "bad" oil uncertainty. It turns out that when a jump in oil uncertainty is common
to all commodities, then the macroeconomic impact is likely to be negative, as generally put
forward in the literature. However, when the uncertainty increase is specific to the oil market,
then the macroeconomic effect tends to be positive in the short run.
A policy recommendation which stems out of our analysis is that economic policies should
also turn their attention to non-oil commodity price fluctuations in order to achieve macroe-
conomic stability, and not only to oil price fluctuations. A macroeconomic stabilization policy
could thus target to reduce uncertainty around commodity prices.
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ANNEX
Figure 9: Investment (INV) responses to exogenous GLUN shocks by country
Note: The solid line shows the estimated IRFs (expressed in %), while the shaded area shows the 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals using 1000 repetitions.
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Figure 10: Exports (EXP) responses to exogenous GLUN shocks by country
Note: The solid line shows the estimated IRFs (expressed in %), while the shaded area shows the 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals using 1000 repetitions.
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Figure 11: Investment (INV) responses to exogenous agricultural uncertainty (AGUN) shocks by country
Note: The solid line shows the estimated IRFs (expressed in %), while the shaded area shows the 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals using 1000 repetitions.
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Figure 12: Investment (INV) responses to exogenous energy uncertainty (ENUN) shocks by country
Note: The solid line shows the estimated IRFs (expressed in %), while the shaded area shows the 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals using 1000 repetitions.
35
Figure 13: Investment (INV) responses to exogenous metals’ uncertainty (MTUN) shocks by country
Note: The solid line shows the estimated IRFs (expressed in %), while the shaded area shows the 68%
bootstrapped confidence intervals using 1000 repetitions.
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